This paper examines how incentive-based and behavior-based variables affect analyst recommendation revisions. Specifically, we use duration analysis to test analysts' underreaction to new information by isolating effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases (i.e., cognitive dissonance and conservatism) on the timing of their recommendation revisions. In an unconditioned circumstance, the results show that analysts are not biased against conveying negative signals. However, when we control for favorable preceding recommendations, we find that analysts delay conveying bad news, which is consistent with the incentives and cognitive dissonance hypotheses. When we control for unfavorable preceding recommendations, the results show that analysts delay conveying good news, which is only consistent with the cognitive dissonance hypothesis. We also find that analysts delay their responses to new favorable information for outperformers from which they have received low representative information relative to high representative information. Our results provide direct evidence that analysts' underreaction to new information is compounded by the effect of conservatism, which suggests that individuals do not update their beliefs adequately in the face of new evidence. Evidence from Recommendation Revisions
Evidence from Recommendation Revisions

Introduction
Considerable prior research supports the notion that analysts' stock ratings hold investment value (e.g., Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001 Barber et al., , 2003 Barber et al., , 2006 Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Moshirian et al., 2009 ). Yet, although research confirms the importance of sell-side security analysts for their efficient functioning within capital markets, the credibility and objectivity of their stock recommendations remains a matter of considerable debate. For example, Barber et al. (2006) find that in mid-2000 buy recommendations accounted for about three-fourths of total outstanding recommendations while sell recommendations totaled only 2 percent. Therefore, we examine whether-and if so, how-analysts bias their reports for either strategic or behavioral reasons.
Prior literature has shown that analysts' tendency to issue excessively optimistic stock recommendations can be linked to certain strategy-based incentives, including cultivating management relations to access private information (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Hodgkinson, 2001; Boni and Womack, 2002; Conrad et al., 2006) , generating investment banking business (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Irvine, 2004; O'Brien et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2006) , and boosting trading commissions (Kim and Lustgarten, 1998; Jackson, 2005;  perceptions when processing information. 3 Prior studies provide substantial evidence that cognitive processing biases affect the formation of analysts' opinions. Barberis et al. (1998) study analyst behavior on overall firms and model how analysts overemphasize prior information and underemphasize new information when valuing firms. Cornell (2001) finds that analysts are reluctant to recognize negative changes in corporate fundamentals, and Eames et al. (2002) suggest that, when generating earnings forecasts, analysts tend to process information in a manner that biases forecasts in the direction that supports their investment recommendation. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that cognitive obstacles prevent analysts from revising their forecasts downward, and Friesena and Wellerb (2006) report strong evidence that analysts are overconfident regarding the precision of their own information and are also subject to cognitive dissonance bias. Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Taffler (2009) find evidence that analysts issue recommendations based on stereotypes instead of the underlying characteristics of the firms they follow.
These cognitive processing biases attribute to the analysts' inefficiency in generating timely and accurate recommendations. The unconscious tendency to process information in a manner that supports one's prior beliefs leads to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) , which is the psychological discomfort that accompanies evidence contradicting prior beliefs. To avoid this psychological discomfort, people tend to forget dissonant-albeit salient-information (Wicklund and Brehm, 1976) . Conservatism, another cognitive processing bias regarding underreaction to new information, suggests that individuals do not update their beliefs adequately in the face of new evidence if they believe that the evidence is not representative (Edwards, 1968) . The difference between cognitive dissonance and conservatism is the characteristics of information: Whereas any discord information may create cognitive dissonance, conservatism is compounded by low representative information. The premise of investor conservatism stems from a number of studies reporting investors' underreaction to new information (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Barberis et al., 1998) . Thus, according to our cognitive processing biases hypotheses, we posit that in generating recommendations, cognitive dissonance and conservatism cause analysts to deviate from rational Bayesian updating.
Building on these two lines of literature, we investigate the effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases on analysts' revision recommendations. To do so, we examine evidence concerning the time it takes for sell-side analysts to convey good news by issuing favorable recommendation revisions relative to conveying bad news by issuing unfavorable recommendation revisions. We provide univariate and Cox hazard model tests to investigate the effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases and report the pattern of analysts conveying good news (favorable recommendation revisions) and analysts conveying bad news (unfavorable recommendation revisions) while controlling for preceding recommendations. We find that the difference in duration between analysts' favorable and unfavorable revisions is insignificant under the unconditioned circumstances. Thus, the notion of delayed response to the bad news of the incentive-based explanation is not supported. When we control for analysts' preceding recommendations, we find that analysts delay conveying bad news if they have previously issued favorable recommendations but they do not delay conveying good news if they have previously issued unfavorable recommendations. The former result is consistent with the phenomenon of incentives and cognitive processing biases concerns. However, the latter result is not consistent with the incentives explanation and suggests that analysts' incentives to be unduly optimistic is not the only factor that influences recommendation revisions.
Analysts' slowness in conveying good news after having previously issued unfavorable recommendations may be explained by either slow stock price recovery by the firm itself or a sluggish stock market. To discriminate among these explanations, we examine the differences in the length of time required to upgrade outperformers and underperformers between a prior unfavorable preceding recommendation and the current revision. This comparison also allows us to distinguish between the different criteria used to classify recommendations into favorable or unfavorable categories. For example, a longer wait time to convey good news may be due to an analyst's higher criterion of issuing favorable revisions. However, if the analyst delays upward revisions for outperformers but not underperformers, then the delay cannot be attributed to higher upgrade standards and is more likely linked to incentive-or cognitive dissociative-based reactions.
Results suggest that neither a slow price recovery of the previously unfavorably rated stocks nor a sluggish stock market explains the slower pace at which analysts make upward revisions.
In addition, to examine the alternative explanation of risk compensation to the outperformers, we control market risk and find no support to suggest that risk compensation drives analysts to delay good news recommendations following preceding unfavorable recommendations. Thus, the findings once again suggest that cognitive dissonance impacts analysts' decision to delay upgrading stocks previously rated unfavorably.
In addition, the underreaction phenomenon is also consistent with conservatism, which suggests that individuals underreact to new information if they believe that the information is not representative. Thus, we further investigate whether, analysts delay updating their recommendations for outperformers due to conservatism. Using recommendation reversal as the proxy for low representative information, we find evidence that analysts delay their response to new favorable information for outperformers when they have prior experience in processing low representative information relative to high representative information. After controlling analysts' coverage preference for size, earnings surprise, year, and industry, our results remain robust.
This paper contributes to the analyst recommendation literature in three ways. First, we
show that incentive-and cognitive-based processing biases (i.e., cognitive dissonance and conservatism), affect analysts' timing of recommendation revisions. We use duration analysis to test directly analysts' underreaction to new information by isolating the effects of incentives and cognitive biases on the timing of their recommendation updates. As a result, this paper is a first step in empirically linking analyst recommendations with information processing biases. Thus, this study identifies factors that may, at least partially, explain the outstanding performance of value portfolios relative to glamour stocks-an anomaly that is pronounced even among stocks that are heavily followed by security analysts. Second, our evidence corroborates both incentive-based and behavior-based hypotheses on analysts' underreaction to new information when issuing recommendations. Specifically, we focus on analysts' processing of information to account for reorganization of the representativeness (high or low) of information. Thus, whereas prior literature typically attributes the underreaction phenomenon to conservatism without identifying information representation, we provide primary evidence that analysts' underreaction to new information is compounded by the effect of conservatism. Finally, this study provides assistance to analysts in developing decision aids and mitigating information processing biases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background and develops the hypotheses regarding analysts' timeliness of conveying new information. Section 3 describes the research design and data selection. Section 4 provides the empirical results. Section 5 provides robustness test results, and Section 6 concludes.
Hypothesis development
Incentives and cognitive dissonance
This study builds on prior research that has explored the effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases on analyst recommendations. The incentives hypothesis asserts that analysts issue unduly optimistic opinions regardless of their prior cognition; that is, they tend, in general, to underreact to bad news. On the other hand, the cognitive processing biases hypothesis stresses analysts' unconscious tendency to underreact to information with certain characteristics. In the case of cognitive dissonance, analysts are prone to underreact to bad (good) news if their prior beliefs are positive (negative). The effects of incentives and cognitive dissonance on analyst recommendations are illustrated in Figure 1 . If analysts underreact to bad news, regardless of their prior beliefs, the incentives hypothesis dominates the cognitive processing biases hypothesis (i.e., both grids II and IV hold). However, if analysts with negative preceding beliefs underreact to good news and analysts with positive preceding beliefs underreact to bas news, the effect of cognitive processing biases exists (i.e., both grids II and III hold).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
To investigate whether incentives or cognitive processing biases come into play when analysts make stock recommendations, we examine the timeliness of recommendation updates. If analysts are prone to respond promptly to good news relative to bad news to maintain management relationships, we should observe that analysts favorably update firms in a more timely manner than unfavorably update firms with both positive and negative preceding opinions.
If analysts are subject to cognitive processing biases, they are prone to respond promptly to good (bad) news when they have positive (negative) preceding belief. We classify recommendations simply as either favorable or unfavorable and include hold recommendations in our unfavorable category because the literature suggests that a hold recommendation is a euphemism for sell (e.g., Francis and Soffer, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998 
Competing explanation
An alternative explanation for analysts' delaying conveying good news conditions on an unfavorable preceding recommendation is firms' slow recovery 5 or a sluggish stock market. To account for these circumstances, we extend the examination of the experimental group in the H 2 portfolio in which analysts' favorable recommendation revisions are conditioned on an unfavorable preceding recommendation. We partition the sample with extreme subsequent stock performance after the unfavorable preceding recommendations into two portfolios, underperformers and outperformers, and examine the difference in time lengths for upgrading the two subsamples. If analysts take more time to convey good news to underperformers than to outperformers (i.e., if the duration is longer between the initial recommendation and upward revision for underperformers than outperformers), the results would suggest that the delay can be attributed to firms' slow recovery rather than analysts' reluctance to issue opinions against their prior beliefs due to behavioral reasons, such as cognitive processing biases. We also control the price performance by employing a market model 6 to discriminate against the explanation of a sluggish stock market. Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis stated in alternative form: 
Conservatism
Another source of cognitive processing bias is conservatism, which suggests that individuals do not update their beliefs adequately in the face of new evidence (Edwards, 1968) .
According to Edwards' experiment, if new information is not representative, people underreact and overrely on their prior beliefs. Our empirical pattern of analyst underreaction to favorable new information for outperformers in H 3 is consistent with an underlying psychological conservatism. To investigate whether the delay in updating their beliefs for the outperformers when new evidence appears is attributable to conservatism, we define a conservatism group consisting of only outperformers with immediate analyst experience of less representative information, and then examine the timeliness in which the analysts update their opinions upward for this subgroup. We use the prior recommendation reversal as an indicator of less 6 We use S&P500 returns as a benchmark and estimate the slope coefficients for the market model via (-120, 10) and (10, 120) windows to calculate abnormal returns.
representative information. If the recommendation reversal contributes to analysts' less timely release of a favorable opinion for the outperformer, the results would suggest that conservatism compounds the subsequent cognitive dissonance and leads to an identifiable underreaction to favorable new information for the outperformer. Accordingly, our fourth hypothesis focuses on the difference in the timeliness of analysts' upgrades for the conservatism group, which consists of outperformers with the prior recommendation reversal, and a matching group, which consists of outperformers with the prior recommendation reiteration. We develop the hypothesis stated in alternative form as follows: 
Data and research design
Data
We compare the timeliness of analysts' conveyance of good news and bad news through their recommendation revisions. Our sample consists of recommendations for S&P500
companies from January 1995 to May 2002. We obtain analyst recommendations from First Call, stock returns from CRSP, and earnings data from COMPUSTAT. We use S&P500 companies to test our hypotheses for two reasons. First, analysts tend to concentrate on large companies and issue more frequent recommendations for large capitalization companies. Second, if a small company performs poorly, it is more likely to be dropped by analysts rather than to receive an unfavorable recommendation. 7 Because First Call does not identify dropped coverage, using large capitalization companies exclusively helps mitigate potential noise. We fix the end of our observation window for revisions at 18 months after the issuance of prior recommendations to further moderate the influence of discontinued coverage. implement. The untabulated results show that incentives hypothesis is statistically insignificant;
7 McNichols and O'Brien (1997) suggest that analysts are prone to drop coverage when faced with unexpected bad earnings news rather than issue negative recommendations. 8 Barber et al. (2006) restrict their recommendation observations less than 12 months under the assumption that such a recommendation has become stale. We follow their assumption and the untabulated results are robust to the inclusion of observations with a duration between the preceding and current recommendations of less than one year. We also repeat the analysis but exclude observations with duration between the preceding and current recommendations exceeding two years and obtain a similar result. We treat durations of two successive recommendations greater than two years as a presumed dropped coverage. Such exclusion trades off a decrease in the number of observations of less than 7% against an increase in the standard deviation of a duration of more than 60%.
the cognitive processing biases hypothesis still holds but is slightly less significant. We also conduct robustness test with controls on analysts' preference of coverage in Section 5.
Research model
We adopt Cox proportional hazard model to investigate the timeliness of analysts' responses to new information (O'Brien et al., 2005) . Using duration analyses, we test whether analysts convey good news through recommendation revisions in a more timely fashion than they convey bad news. Namely, we examine the length of time before analysts making upward recommendation revisions relative to making downward revisions. We measure the duration in the hazard model as the number of days from the preceding recommendation to the current recommendation issued by the same analyst. For example, to test H 1 and H 2A we examine whether analysts issue favorable recommendations in a more timely fashion than they make downward revisions, following the analyst's favorable and unfavorable preceding recommendation, respectively. The duration before an upward revision is the number of calendar days between the preceding recommendation and the current favorable revision. We adopt downward revisions as a comparison base to measure the relative speed of upgrades.
The data for duration analyses have right censored observations and cannot be analyzed without taking into account the censored observations because longer-lived prior opinions are generally more likely to be censored. Another characteristic of our data is that responses cannot be negative. Accordingly, an adjustment such as a log transformation for the duration of two successive recommendations may be necessary or that specialized methods may be more appropriate than those that assume a normal distribution for the error term. Cox (1972 Cox ( , 1975 introduced the partial likelihood function to estimate the unknown regression parameters associated with the explanatory variables. Adopting the Cox regression, we can estimate unbiased and asymptotically normal coefficients without identifying the form of the baseline hazard function. The general form of the Cox proportional standard continuous-time model is
where
Ζ is the vector of explanatory variables for the ith observation, and β is the vector of coefficients. analysts appear to convey bad news more promptly than good news. Collectively, when we control for the preceding recommendations, the univariate tests show that analysts are not biased against conveying bad news as opposed to good news, at least when measured in terms of timeliness. The descriptive statistics support the notion that the incentives hypothesis is, at best, not the only factor that influences analysts' recommendation revisions and that analysts are subject to cognitive processing biases (i.e., cognitive dissonance, conservatism) when revising their recommendations.
Empirical results
Univariate analysis for incentives and cognitive dissonance hypotheses
Hazard model analysis for incentives and cognitive dissonance hypotheses
We further use a hazard model to test the difference in duration between analysts' decision to revise favorably and to revise unfavorably. We adopt unfavorable revisions as a baseline to measure the timeliness in which analysts convey good news and report the results of Cox regressions for our hypotheses of upward recommendation revisions. Panel A of Table 2 provides the results of the likelihood ratio, score, and Wald tests to show the suitability of the upgrade indicator as an explanatory variable.
[INSERT 
Competing explanation and recommendation drift 4.3.1. Firms' slow recovery and a sluggish stock market
Panel A of Prior research has shown that analyst recommendations embody information perceived as valuable by the market. After analysts issue unfavorable recommendations, stock prices decline.
Therefore, stocks with an unfavorable preceding recommendation may take longer to reach higher cumulative abnormal returns than to reach lower cumulative abnormal returns before being upgraded to the favorable category. That is, the duration for the outperformers is inherently longer than the duration for the underperformers. To determine whether the delayed response to the outperformers stems from cognitive dissonance, we lessen the effect of the capital market reaction to the unfavorable recommendations. According to Womack (1996) , because the three-trading-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the recommendation date significantly declines for added-to-sell recommendation changes, we exclude three-trading-day abnormal returns after the unfavorable preceding recommendations and recalculate the highest and the lowest quartiles for both outperformers and underperformers to lessen the negative effect of capital market reaction after unfavorable recommendations are released. 11 The untabulated results support our previous finding that, when assessing stocks with an unfavorable preceding recommendation, analysts delay upgrading those stocks with better subsequent performance and, in contrast, upgrade in a more timely manner those stocks with inferior performance. Thus, the rejection of the third hypothesis suggests that a slow stock price recovery of previously unfavorably rated stocks or a sluggish stock market is not an explanation for the slower pace at which analysts make upward revisions.
We next examine the timeliness of analysts conveying good news for outperformers and underperformers in the third hypothesis. The duration analysis results are presented in Panels A and B of 
Recommendation drifts for outperformers and underperformers
We also inspect the stock market reaction to the favorable recommendation revisions. Panel C of Table 4 reports cumulative returns after the issuance of the current recommendation revisions for 21 and 126 trading days. The results show that the 21-trading-day cumulative abnormal return is 28.90% greater for the outperformers than for the underperformers. During the 126 trading days subsequent to when analysts upgrade the outperformers, cumulative abnormal returns are 70.17%, which is significantly greater than for the underperformers. In addition, outperformers perform better than underperformers both before and after the favorable recommendation revisions (see Panel A of Table 3 and Panel C of Table 4 , respectively). Further, the panels show that cumulative abnormal returns are greater before the upgraded recommendations are issued relative to after they are issued. The result suggests that analysts take longer to convey good news for outperformers than underperformers when conditioned on the preceding issuance of the negative opinions. Such underreaction phenomenon for outperformers in the univariate test persists for almost all sample years regardless of whether the outperformers are identified based on cumulative abnormal returns or cumulative raw returns.
Thus, the results are inconsistent with the returns providing compensation for risk.
Univariate and hazard model analyses for conservatism hypothesis
To explore whether the conservatism contributes to the underreaction to good news for the 531 outperformers, conditioned on the unfavorable preceding recommendations (in H 3 ), we partition the observations with the underreaction effect into a conservatism subgroup and a matching subgroup. The conservatism subgroup of 454 observations contains outperformers from which analysts receive less representative information and generates recommendation reversals. The matching group of 77 observations contains outperformers from which analysts receive highly representative information and generates reiterated recommendations. To reduce the influence of analysts who drop coverage, we exclude observations with a duration longer than four years between the second last prior recommendation and the current revision. We also exclude observations with the duration longer than 18 months between the last recommendation and the current favorable revision in both the conservative and matching groups.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Panels A and B of Table 5 report the results for H 4 with the hazard model. The negative 12 We also conduct the sensitivity tests with recommendations separated by less than two years and three years for conservatism and matching groups. The untabulated test results are consistent with our findings.
coefficient in H 4 shows that analysts upgrade the conservatism group in a less timely manner than the matching group. Namely, analysts delay their response to new favorable information for outperformers when they have experienced processing less representative information relative to highly representative information. The hazard ratio of 0.605 for the conservatism group suggests that, conditional on having arrived at time t without an upgrade, analysts are approximately 61%
likely to upgrade outperformers with less representative information than to upgrade outperformers with highly representative information.
Panel C of Table 5 shows that the analysts with immediately prior experience of interpreting less representative information on firms do not upgrade their recommendations on these firms until their mean cumulative abnormal return reaches 66.92%, which is approximately 4% greater than the matching firms' cumulative abnormal return of 62.68%. Panel D shows that analysts take, on average, approximately 243 (180) days to upgrade the stocks in the conservatism (matching) portfolio. This finding echoes the results from the hazard tests, which shows that analysts take longer to convey favorable opinions for stocks previously downgraded from the favorable category than those previously receiving unfavorable recommendations. Namely, analysts' underreaction to new information may be compounded by conservatism resulting from less representative information.
Recommendation drifts for conservatism and matching groups
Panel A in Table 6 indicates that the mean abnormal return on the recommendation date is 2.74% for the conservatism group and 2.14% for the matching group; the corresponding raw returns are 2.28% and 0.89%, respectively. On average, currently favorably rated companies have both significantly positive raw returns and abnormal returns. The results confirm previous evidence that recommendations convey information regarding the investment value (e.g., Barber et al., 2001 Barber et al., , 2003 Barber et al., , 2006 Womack, 1996) . The insignificant difference in abnormal return between the conservatism and matching groups shows that investors do not distinguish analysts'
upgrades for the conservatism group from upgrades for the matching group after controlling for the risk premium.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Panel B of Table 6 reports the cumulative returns subsequent to the current favorable recommendation revisions for both the conservatism and matching groups. As the panel shows, the subsequent cumulative abnormal returns for 21 trading days for the conservatism and the matching groups are 16.62% and 17.27%, respectively. Both cumulative abnormal returns are approximately 25% of the corresponding abnormal returns between the recommendation dates in Panel C in Table 5 . Similarly, 21-trading-day cumulative raw returns (untabulated) are approximately 20% of the corresponding raw returns for both groups. Moreover, for the conservatism group, the cumulative abnormal return for 126 trading days after the current recommendation revision is 72.77% (Panel B, Table 6 ), which is greater than the return of 66.92% during the period between the two recommendations (Panel C, Table 5 ). In contrast, the cumulative abnormal return for the matching group is 54.82%, which is merely 87% of the corresponding duration return of 62.68%. Collectively, one-month buy-and-hold returns of analysts' upgraded stocks arrive at one-fifth to one-fourth of the returns between the two recommendations. After being held for six months, the stocks generate cumulative abnormal return accounting for at least 87% of the abnormal returns between the recommendations. The six-month buy-and-hold abnormal return for the conservatism group is notably greater than the return for the matching group.
Robustness test
Prior studies suggest that analysts pay less attention not only to smaller firms but also to firms with fewer earnings surprises. If so, restricting our sample to S&P500 companies may not be sufficient to control for analysts' coverage preference. Moreover, the duration variable may be a function of factors such as firm size and market value. To test the sensitivity of our results to the these concerns, we use variables that affect analysts' preference for coverage as proxies to select firms that are more likely to be consistently followed (Heckman, 1979; Rajan and Servaes, 1997 ) and restrict the sample to the selected firms to mitigate analysts' selection bias.
We adopt a logistic model with proxies for analyst inclination to cover a stock. We define a dummy dependent variable, with Y 0 as a representative firm that analysts are unlikely to follow and Y 1 as the opposite. If analysts issue recommendations accompanying the quarterly earnings announcements, then we define the firm as a member of group Y 1 . The logistic model is
where MV is the natural logarithm of the market value; UE is the absolute earnings surprise on the basis of the random walk model; The untabulated results indicate that the natural logarithm of the market value, earnings surprise, and most of the independent dummy variables are appropriate variables for analyst coverage. When a firm's estimated probability in the logit model is greater than 0.5, we categorize the firm as part of the group that analysts are more likely to follow. We reexamine our hypotheses with the sample selected by this logit model. The finding indicates that our hypothesis test results are robust.
Conclusion
This study isolates effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases and directly tests analysts' underreaction to new information when updating their opinions through recommendation revisions. We provide univariate and Cox hazard model tests to investigate the effects of incentives and cognitive processing biases and report the pattern of analysts conveying good news and analysts conveying bad news with controlling for preceding recommendations.
We find that the difference in duration between analysts' favorable and unfavorable revisions is insignificant under the unconditioned circumstances. Thus, the notion of delayed response to the bad news of the incentive-based explanation is not supported. We further control for analysts' preceding opinions. We find that analysts delay conveying bad news if they have previously issued favorable recommendations, but they do not delay conveying good news if they have previously issued unfavorable recommendations. The former result is consistent with the phenomenon of incentives and cognitive processing biases concerns. However, the latter result is not consistent with the incentives explanation and suggests that analysts' incentives to be unduly optimistic is not the only factor that influences recommendation revisions.
We also discriminate the alternative explanations of firms' slow recovery, a sluggish market, and analysts' different criteria of upgrades and downgrades through controlling stocks performance before analysts' revision issuance. We find that when we control for unfavorable preceding recommendations, less time passes before analysts convey good news, which is consistent with the hypothesis of cognitive processing biases. Because the preceding negatively recommended stocks are candidates for a contrarian strategy, this study provides an explanation for the effectiveness in value stock investment. We also find evidence for the conservatism bias proposed by Edwards (1968) 28.00 (2.80***) The favorable category includes analysts' strong buy and buy recommendations, and the unfavorable category contains analysts' strong sell, sell, and hold recommendations. CAR [-1, 0] is the cumulative abnormal return between the preceding and the current recommendation. Outperformers and underperformers are formed, respectively, by the last-and the first-quartile between-recommendation cumulative abnormal stock returns and cumulative raw returns. Panel A reports cumulative returns for outperformers and underperformer between the unfavorable preceding recommendation and the favorable recommendation revision. Panel B shows speeds of issuing upward revisions for the outperformers and underperformers conditioning on unfavorable preceding recommendations. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The favorable category includes analysts' strong buy and buy recommendations, and the unfavorable category contains analysts' strong sell, sell, and hold recommendations. CAR(t) is the cumulative abnormal returns for t trading days after the recommendation revision is issued to capture the successive performance after analysts update their current opinions. Panels A and B present the results of Cox regression for outperformers (H 3 ) with favorable recommendation revisions conditioning on unfavorable categories. The baseline for H 3 is underperformers. We use partial likelihood method to estimate coefficients. Panel C reports cumulative returns after the current recommendation revisions for 21 and 126 trading days. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
